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Abstract
Food fraud is an intentional act for economic gain. It poses a risk to food integrity, the economy, public health and consumers’
ethics. Seafood is one commodity which has endured extensive fraudulent activity owing to its increasing consumer demand,
resource limitations, high value and complex supply chains. It is essential that these fraudulent opportunities are revealed, the risk
is evaluated and countermeasures for mitigation are assigned. This can be achieved throughmapping of the seafood supply chains
and identifying the vulnerability analysis critical control points (VACCP), which can be exposed, infiltrated and exploited for
fraudulent activity. This research systematically maps the seafood supply chain for three key commodities: finfish, shellfish and
crustaceans in the United Kingdom. Each chain is comprised of multiple stakeholders across numerous countries producing a
diverse range of products distributed globally. For each supply chain the prospect of fraud, with reference to species substitution,
fishery substitution, illegal, unreported and unregulated substitution, species adulteration, chain of custody abuse, catch method
fraud, undeclared product extension, modern day slavery and animal welfare, has been identified and evaluated. This mapping of
the fraudulent opportunities within the supply chains provides a foundation to rank known and emerging risks and to develop a
proactive mitigation plan which assigns control measures and responsibility where vulnerabilities exist. Further intelligence
gathering and management of VACCPs of the seafood supply chains may deter currently unknown or unexposed fraudulent
opportunities.
Keywords Food fraud . Food integrity . HACCP . Seafood supply chain . TACCP . VACCP
1 Introduction
Globally, the food sector plays a significant direct role in hu-
man well-being through the provision of authentic food ‘fit for
human consumption’ (European Commission 2002).
Inadequacies in food quality, safety, defence and fraud surveil-
lance have been identified as food integrity risks and of in-
creasing sectoral, government and consumer concern
(Galimberti et al. 2013). In particular, food fraud, defined as
Bfood which is deliberately placed on the market for financial
gain, with the intention of deceiving the consumer^, is of
heightened concern following recent media coverage of food
fraud instances and their consequences (Kamruzzaman et al.
2015; FSA 2016). For the consumer, food fraud can deny their
rights to make an informed choice, especially if based on
ethical or religious issues (Woolfe and Primrose 2004;
Fajardo et al. 2010; Johnson 2014; Ali et al. 2015). In the food
industry, food fraud creates economic and sustainability con-
cerns, evident in food businesses which are hit with the cost of
recalling products and the subsequent impact on brand repu-
tation (Jacquet and Pauly 2008), and places pressure on small-
to-medium sized enterprises to purchase cheaper ingredients
in order to compete and sustain their business. Although the
intention is for profit and not to cause harm, the availability of
potential contaminants and allergens introduces the unknown
into the supply chain and can lead to severe illness or death
depending on the potency of the materials used and the sus-
ceptibility of the consumer (Pascual et al. 2008; Sheth et al.
2010; Triantafyllidis et al. 2010; Spink andMoyer 2011; Chen
et al. 2012; Dennis and Kelly 2013; Paiva 2013; Stamatis et al.
2015; Tähkäpää et al. 2015).
In the United Kingdom, the modern day supply chain al-
lows ingredients and products to be sourced and transported
among a range of countries and supply chain players for raw
materials, processing and retail. These can be supplied
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through individual food companies/importers or from foreign
owned entities within a larger multinational company, such as
global sourcing between parent and subsidiary (Johnson
2014). Complex supply chains create opportunities for fraud-
ulent activity arising from difficulties in sufficient surveillance
(Dennis and Kelly 2013; Manning and Soon 2014). Coupled
with rising prices, scarcity of raw ingredients, the competitive
nature of the food industry, the constant drive to reduce costs
and maximise profits, and the customers desire for variety and
access at low cost means that illegal, fraudulent activities and/
or products tempt and are sometimes necessary for players in
the supply chain in order to sustain their market (Dennis and
Kelly 2013; Elliott 2014).
The US Pharmacopeial (USP) Food Fraud Database (USP
2014), reports byOceana and Consumer Unions (Oceana 2016;
Warner et al. 2013; Warner et al. 2016) and scientific publica-
tions on food fraud have revealed that fraud is highly prevalent
in the seafood supply chain (Hellberg and Morrissey 2011;
Moore et al. 2012; Everstine et al. 2013a, b; Galimberti et al.
2013; Hurst et al. 2014; Johnson 2014; Mueller et al. 2015;
Stamatis et al. 2015). This has been attributed to the increasing
demand and recognition of seafood as a healthy alternative to
red meat, the similarity and diversity of seafood species avail-
able, the stock limitations and price pressures in the food mar-
ket (Martinez and Friis 2004; Jacquet and Pauly 2008; Mazzeo
et al. 2008; Barbuto et al. 2010; Miller and Mariani 2010;
Heyden et al. 2010; Mohanty et al. 2013; Leal et al. 2015;
Mueller et al. 2015; Stamatis et al. 2015; Jennings et al.
2016). As consumer demand rises towards the estimated
seven-fold increase in seafood production required to meet
the predicted global population growth of over 9.8 billion by
2050 (Delgado et al. 2003; United Nations 2015; Jennings et al.
2016), the number of cases of food adulteration and interven-
tion of opportunistic elements in the seafood industry increases
(Mohanty et al. 2013). This exploitation in the seafood supply
chains is concerning as it poses economic, ethical and food
safety consequences (Buck 2010; Johnson 2014). Moreover,
the scope and impact of seafood fraud can vary widely. It can
occur at every pass of custody in the seafood supply chains,
from large-scale multi-national schemes involving importers, to
fraudulent activities at individual restaurants or grocery stores.
Each aggregator, shipper or wholesaler who collects, blends, or
repackages can change the identity, purity and authenticity of
the ingredient (Moore et al. 2012). The scientific literature ad-
vocates vulnerability assessment as the first step in preventing
food fraud (Spink et al. 2014, 2016a). To conduct such an
assessment the priority is to identifty each node in the seafood
supply chain. A node represents a distinct organisation that is
involved in producing and/or delivering the product. They are
differentiated based on their unique function in the supply
chain. The product flows between nodes from source to con-
sumer to make up the supply chain. Identification of each node
will allow food fraud vulnerabilites to be identified, effective
control measures assigned and mitigation measures implement-
ed as close as possible to their point of entry. To date there has
been limitedmapping of the seafood supply chain in correlation
with fraudulent opportunities within the scientific literature.
The objective of this study is to address this deficiency by
systematically mapping the seafood supply chain in the UK
and to understand and describe the issues pertaining to seafood
fraud at each of the supply chain nodes for subsequent vulner-
ability analysis of the seafood supply chain.
2 Methodology
A review of the literature and the application of the prelimi-
nary step for vulnerability analysis critical control point
(VACCP) evaluation, i.e. intelligence gathering, was per-
formed to map the seafood supply chain in the UK and inves-
tigate the opportunities for fraud. This involved a search of
Web of Science, for articles in the English Language, pub-
lished between January 1950 and December 2016 and where
the full text was available for viewing. Specific key words and
the combination of these key words were established to in-
clude: (Seafood or Fish or Crustacean) AND (BSupply
Chain^) AND (map or outline or diagram or picture or Bmass
balance^ or model*). A total of 54 relevant articles were eval-
uated and formed the basis of the seafood supply chain. This
supply chain was reviewed by experts within the UK seafood
industry. The search strategy was then amended to include
(Seafood or Fish or Crustacean) AND (Food Fraud or
Adulteration or Vulnerability). This search retrieved 112 arti-
cles which were analysed thematically to understand the vul-
nerability of the seafood supply chain to fraud.
3 Seafood supply chain
The definition of terms for products when deliberating fraud is
of utmost importance. BSeafood^ is used to indicate edible
aquatic life forms, such as fish, molluscs and crustaceans
(Stamatis et al. 2015). BFinfish^ is used to describe any animal
with a backbone, gills and limbs in the shape of fins.
BCrustacean^ is an arthropod of the aquatic group Crustacea,
such as a crab, lobster or shrimp. BShellfish^ is an aquatic
shelled mollusc and crustacean though for regulatory pur-
poses, and the purposes of this review it is often defined as
filter feeding molluscs such as clams, mussels and oyster. The
seafood supply chain involves eight key stages, including:
source; hatchery operations (aquaculture only); nursery oper-
ations (aquaculture only); ongrowing techniques / wild; har-
vesting; processing; market, and consumers. These stages dif-
fer slightly for each of the supply chains of finfish (Fig. 1),
molluscs (Fig. 2) and crustaceans (Fig. 3).
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3.1 Source
Seafood originates from the natural ‘wild’ ecosystem or aqua-
culture in the cultivation of aquatic species (Denham et al.
2015; FAO 2016a). In the wild, seafood can be found in hab-
itats, which allow them to reproduce, develop and survive.
Finfish (Fig. 1) occupy waterbodies such as lakes, rivers, la-
goons, coastal estuaries and the ocean (Purser and Forteath
Source Seed Production On Growing Farm Harvesting andProcessing
Wholesale and
Distribution Market Consumers
Fig. 2 The shellfish supply chain consisting of seven key stages from source to consumption
Fig. 1 The finfish supply chain consisting of ten key stages from source to consumption
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2003). Shellfish (Fig. 2) inhabit littoral rock, intertidal estuaries
(e.g. rock, mangroves andman-made structures), sub-tidal estu-
aries (e.g. natural dredge beds), saltmarshes and biogenic reef
beds, saline lagoons, and, deep in the sand or silty mud in the
intertidal zone (Launey et al. 2002; Sarkis 2007). Crustaceans
(Fig. 3) exist in ocean and coastal estuaries, brackish waters and
lagoons, mangrove areas and lentic or lotic freshwater (FAO
2016a). Inaquaculture, farmerssourceorpurchase theseed, spat,
post larvaeor juveniles fromeither theirnaturalhabitator froman
ongrowing facility, nationally or internationally. These are
transported to a hatchery, nursery or ongrowing facility, depend-
ing on their stage of growth. Seed can alternatively be sourced
from the commercial production of eggs (Hardy et al. 2000)
through the capturing and conditioning of broodstock (natural
or artificial spawning) in a broodstock unit (Fernandez and
Rodríguez 2003; Seafish 2005; Sarkis 2007). Broodstock may
be sourced from capture fisheries or ongrowing facilities of
farmers, a middleman or importer (Cuiñas et al. 2014; Parreño-
Marchante et al. 2014). The fertilised eggs or viable gametes are
obtained and transferred or sold to a hatchery.
3.2 Hatchery operations
At the hatchery, artificial fertilisation of the viable gametes from
the broodstock is performed in-vitro (Hardy et al. 2000). Eggs
fertilisednaturallyand thosecollected fromthewildor farms, are
allowed to hatch with the offspring, fed and maintained at opti-
mumconditions throughtheearly lifestagesuntil asufficientsize
is reached to commence nursery operations or to be shipped on
order to thegrowers (FernandezandRodríguez2003;Purser and
Forteath 2003; Sarkis 2007). Hatchery systems can range from
specialised, small, unsophisticated units to large, sophisticated
and environmentally controlled installations, together withmat-
uration units. Some hatcheries are integrated with nursery and
grow-out facilities (FAO 2016a). Hatchery operations may also
occurat sea. In this case, the seed is captured fromthewild inspat
collectors, strung from longlines below thewater surface and are
allowed to hatch and grow there until they are ready to enter the
nursery phase (Gosling 2003;Launey et al. 2002).Occasionally,
the nursing of hatchery produced post larvae can be impractical
and unnecessary, so the farmers skip the nursery stage and trans-
fer or sell directly to the treated grow out facilities (FAO 2016a).
3.3 Nursery operations
Nursery operations commence following the direct sale or
transfer from hatchery operations or wild capture (Purser
and Forteath 2003). The seafood is fed and maintained at
optimum conditions until they reach an adequate size and
have adapted for survival in ongrowing facilities.
Implemented systems are dependent on the species and farm-
er. For finfish (Fig. 1), the operations mimic their natural
Source Seed Production On Growing Farm Harvesting andProcessing
Wholesale and
Distribution Market Consumers
Fig. 3 The crustacean supply chain consisting of seven key stages from source to consumption
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habitat, comprising treated fresh, brackish, marine or man-
made waterbodies (Purser and Forteath 2003). For shellfish
(Fig. 2), the spats are carefully resettled on: on-bottom culture
in the intertidal zone directly on the beach; off-bottom culture
in mesh or screen enclosures, either intertidally or sub-tidally;
suspended in deep water from longlines and rafts; in inland
ponds or tanks involving upweller and downweller systems,
or; floating culture on trays in raft systems (Gosling 2003;
BCSGA 2016). In crustacean aquaculture (Fig. 3), the nursery
operations may include indoor or outdoor nurseries in the
form of treated earthen ponds, impoundment nets, pens or
small enclosures in the earthen department of grow-out ponds,
paddy fields, or, greenhouse, concrete or lined raceways
which prevent their escape (Seafish 2002). Moreover, nursery
rearing may involve a two-stage system of cement tanks or
fine mesh cages for intensive rearing before transfer to earthen
ponds or paddy fields (FAO 2016a).
3.4 Ongrowing techniques
In the wild, once finfish, crustaceans or shellfish achieve
fertilisation and the resultant eggs hatch, the juveniles or spat
reside in a habitat with adequate conditions for survival. In
aquaculture, the species is transferred or sold from the nursery
operations to an ongrowing facility for growth to a marketable
size. Alternatively, the juveniles may be directly transported
from wild capture or purchased from farms to ongrowing pro-
duction systems. For finfish (Fig. 1), the ongrowing sites com-
prise ocean, coastal, on land or indoor systems. In the ocean,
floating cages enclose and submerge the finfish at different
levels (Purser and Forteath 2003). At the coast, lagoons or
brackish water bodies are adapted to allow fish to enter but
prevent escape.On land, the finfishcanbe reared in apond, tank
or racewayand suppliedwithwater in a continuous flowsystem
(Hardyet al. 2000; Fernandez andRodríguez2003) or in indoor
tanks using recirculating water systems (FAO 2016a). In shell-
fish ongrowing operations (Fig. 2), on-bottom, off-bottom,
floating or suspension culture are utilised (Launey et al. 2002).
On-bottom culture involves seeding in a suitable substrate in
designated plots, including ponds, coastal lagoons and estuar-
ies.Off-bottomculture involves rackandbag culture,where the
shellfish are placed in plastic bags, baskets or tumblers support-
ed off the ground. Floating culture involves the rearing of shell-
fish sub-tidallyon covered rafts structures supportedby floats in
groups called parks. These rafts hold three ropes for collecting
seed, growing shellfish and marketable shellfish. This allows
continuous production. Suspension culture comprises growing
the shellfish from floats or subtidal longlines in deeper subtidal
watersandcan take theformof traycultureor lanternnet culture.
The longline culture can be adapted to allow the shellfish to be
set on strands of rope stretched above the ground with pegs.
Alternatively, the shellfish may be ear-hung in pairs and at-
tached to vertical and horizontal lines in shallow water lease
areas. The Bouchet technique is another suspension culture
method comprising wooden poles separated in rows and pro-
truding above the seabed in the intertidal region for spat settle-
ment and ongrowing (BCSGA 2016; FAO 2016a). In crusta-
cean ongrowing (Fig. 3) ponds, net pens in small lakes and
reservoirs, paddy fields and irrigation ditches are used
(Seafish 2005; FAO 2016a). These ongrowing facilities are
stockedwith crustaceansbrought in by the tidalwaterorbyauto
stockingwith farmedcrustaceans. Insomecases, the speciesare
capable of maintaining self-sustaining populations and
this system only needs stocked once e.g. crawfish.
Those reared in a super-intensive greenhouse raceway
system use no water exchange (only the replacement of
evaporation losses) or discharge whereas those raised in an
irrigation ditch have an area of dry land with an artificial
supply of water (FAO 2016a).
3.5 Harvesting techniques
Once the seafood reaches marketable size, they are harvested.
The method implemented is dependent on the species and the
ongrowing system. Wild finfish are harvested by fishermen
(Fig. 1) hauling the fish from the water using netting, angling
or trapping methods. The catch are placed in dedicated fish
boxes whilst by-catch is discarded at sea, where legally per-
missible to do so (Ringsberg and Mirzabeiki 2014; Gordon
and Hussain 2015). Finfish reared in indoor tanks, are graded
and transferred to holding tanks before transport to the pro-
cessing facility. Floating cages are simply lifted out of the
water and the stock removed. Land based systems, including
tanks, pens, ponds or cages, typically undergo water lowering
followed by sweep nets and vacuum pumping (Purser and
Forteath 2003). Shellfish in their natural habitat or those cul-
tured on on-bottom culture, are typically harvested by scuba
divers or dredging. Shellfish produced in bags or planted on
substrate are excavated by rake or hand and collected in mesh
bags. Mechanical harvesting, including suction, elevator
dredges or a tractor equipped with a lateral conveyor belt,
may be used to dig and grade the shellfish (Gosling 2003).
Shellfish reared on raft culture are either harvested using a
crane to raise the ropes to the boat or by sinking floats under
the raft to catch the shellfish once the culture ropes are cut.
Those produced from suspended culture using craft of various
types are often fitted with mechanical winches which remove
and transfer the shellfish to a trailer or inboard containers.
Shellfish grown on longlines are harvested by vessels fitted
with mini-cranes which raise the heavy shellfish laden long-
line to a hydraulic stripper to remove and pass the shellfish
into a revolving drum for cleaning, de-clumping and sorting
into transporting or wholesale sacks ready for landing
(Launey et al. 2002). Any weak or damaged shells are
discarded (Fig. 2). Re-watering on the substrate in the inter-
tidal zonemay be required to excrete mud, grit and sand and to
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allow recovery from the dredging stress. Crustaceans harvest-
ed from the wild or aquaculture involves either trap (creeling)
or trawl capture. Baited traps in various forms of cages and
baskets are placed in designated areas, inland or along the
shore, to catch a wide variety of crustacean species. After
capture, the crustaceans are manhandled, removed and placed
in a container for sorting and processing before storage (Fig.
3) (Seafish 2005). In trawl capture, cone-shaped nets or pots
are towed by boats on the bottom or mid water and hauled up
into the vessel where the catch is removed and placed in a
container for on-board sorting and processing before storage.
When legally permitted, any undersized seafood or by-catch
are immediately returned to the sea. Smaller vessels either
store their catch in boxes or cages and land daily or underwa-
ter until collection from the buyer. Larger vessels store their
catch alive in vivier tanks on-board the vessel and land their
catch after several days of fishing. Some vessels may have
catch handling, packing and freezing capabilities to allow
these processes to occur at sea before landing or delivery to
a mother ship which lands combined catches from different
vessels (Fig. 3) (Farmery et al. 2015).
3.6 Handling and processing
Once the finfish, crustaceans and shellfish have been harvest-
ed they are either destined for restocking for angling purposes,
aquaculture, animal feed or human consumption. Those spe-
cies which are destined for angling or aquaculture purposes
are checked for quality and disease, before careful transporta-
tion to the desired facility (FAO 2016a). Those for human
consumption enter a diverse and complex stream of com-
merce, involving many actors and transit between countries
for various stages of processing, combination of lots, and sale
of products to customers and consumers (Bakhrankova et al.
2014; Borit and Santos 2015). From this point onwards, sea-
food from the wild and aquaculture sub-sectors compete in the
same market. Seafood is sold live or slaughtered as fresh and
value added products.
In the case of wild finfish (Fig. 1) fishermen may undertake
gutting at sea and vessels may have handling, packing and
freezing capabilities. The catch is transported to a private or
public landing in several fishing ports and piers, directly or via
a mother-ship. On landing, fish boxes are moved to the quay
were the fish is either auctioned in batches or sold individually
or as specified in a sales agreement to collectors, auction mar-
kets, wholesalers, factory agents, processors, retailers and the
final consumer (Fig. 1). For minimal spoiling the head re-
mains but the fish is gutted (if desired), washed, chilled, grad-
ed and packed on ice. At this stage, disposition of catch into
fresh or frozen markets will depend upon the intended cus-
tomer demands. Alternatively, fish may progress on for pri-
mary processing where they are filleted (often boneless),
matched with orders which indicate specific quality demands
and sent for outbound transport either as fresh or frozen fillets.
Customers can be secondary processors, wholesalers, re-
tailers, restaurants and private customers, nationally or inter-
nationally and the order can vary from one to several fish or
fish boxes (Fig. 1) (Mai et al. 2011; Donnelly and Olsen 2012;
Cuiñas et al. 2014; Parreño-Marchante et al. 2014; FAO
2016a). Marketable shellfish (Fig. 2) is typically washed,
cleaned and sorted by the farmer and transported live in the
shell to the processing and packing plant. Primary processing
includes washing, grading, declumping and debyssing before
packaging into bags. Shellfish are routed to depuration plants
(if required), fresh markets or sold or transferred for further
processing both nationally and internationally. Depuration is
required for shellfish harvested in areas with unsatisfactory
results and classification in the sanitary survey and on-going
strategic water sampling programs (Fig. 2) (Launey et al.
2002; Gosling 2003; BCSGA 2016; FAO 2016a).
Crustaceans (Fig. 3) of commercial significance can be
delivered into the food chain as live or raw product, fresh,
frozen or cooked. Crustaceans are typically washed, cleaned
and weighed immediately after harvest. Those to be sold as
live produce are stored in holding tanks, transported and kept
moist. In some instances, their limbs are tied to reduce move-
ment and ice bags employed to maintain a low temperature
and mortality rate. The live products are typically transported
directly to aquarium tanks in restaurants or chilled to a tem-
perature in which they become in-active before export. Those
that are intended to be sold fresh, are typically killed in a
mixture of water and ice at the pond bank and washed.
Crustaceans sold fresh must not be kept on ice for more
than three days whereas those frozen must be quick-
frozen at -10°C and stored at -18°C or below. Those
to be processed are transported in insulated tanks to
processing sites where they are cleaned and sorted into
various grades to match market and export requirements
(Seafish 2005).
Secondary processors implement value-added processing
such as breading, battering, smoking, salting or other value
added processing and preservation techniques to achieve a
store ready product (Denham et al. 2015). Processors require
a reliable source of the desired species to meet production and
market demands. Such sources may include various auction
markets, suppliers and imports of both fresh and frozen sea-
food. Others may have tighter bonds to the fishermen and
farmers through ownership, proprietary unloading facilities
or direct purchase (Jensen et al. 2010).
Waste can now derive a value. It is increasingly used in
alternative product streams to enhance the efficiency and prof-
itability of a production system. The edible and non-edible
parts (e.g. meat, internal organs, blood, and soft tissues) of
the slaughtered seafood animal are often sold and used as
raw materials for manufacturing novel products such as, fish
meal for aquaculture and agriculture, bait, pet food, liquid
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fertiliser, a source of lactic acid or plastic production, edible
products including fish sauce, fish oil, calcium and protein
powder, sale of dried fish heads to African markets and sale
of fish frames for production of flavour in other fish products.
This presents a separate, but linked supply chain (Denham et
al. 2015; James et al. 2015).
Following processing, the seafood is stored in cold storage
and distributed to customers for national consumption or
exported to foreign markets or processors (FAO 2016a).
Distributors typically serve as intermediates between proces-
sors and sellers, with exporters and importers also acting as
distributors (Christensen et al. 2011; FAO 2016a).
3.7 Market
A variety of global customers purchase the seafood produced
nationally and internationally. These customers can receive
fish at landings or directly from primary processors, secondary
processors or wholesalers. Customers include; auction mar-
kets, wholesalers, consumers, international or national retail
chains and food service companies (Asioli et al. 2014; Avadí
et al. 2014). Collectors and auction markets are used for the
first hand sales where there is high potential for batch mixing
from several fishermen, which is then split among buyers
(Jensen et al. 2010). Wholesaler commercial merchants pur-
chase product in bulk from producers, wholesale marketers,
primary processors, secondary processors and importers who
subsequently subdivide the products and supply retailers and
food service establishments nationally and internationally
(Kobayashi et al. 2004). Retailers display the store ready prod-
uct to the consumers in the desired storage cabinets, or as fresh
fillet products were the consumer chooses the desired fish
before packaging (Kobayashi et al. 2004). These retailers are
increasingly dominated by large, centrally managed retailers
such as supermarket chains and web-based retailers (Chen
2013). The foodservice customer buy the fish, prepare it and
sell it to the end consumer as a component of meals (FAO
2016a). Seafood production is similar for foreign seafood
products, with one exception, these products enter the
imported country’s supply chain through an importer and then
move on to a distributor who supplies seafood to landings,
wholesalers or processors as either a live, raw, semi-
processed or final product for farming, processing or supply
to customers and consumers nationally or export internation-
ally (FAO 2016a). The most valuable species that are cultured
in the UK are exported (e.g. shellfish and salmon), along with
lower value, high volume but nutritious species that are not
favoured byUK consumers (e.g. mackerel and herring). These
seafood may be exported post-harvest, after primary process-
ing, or following secondary processing as a store ready prod-
uct. Moreover, seafood may pass through one or more inter-
mediary countries for post-harvest processing and subsequent
re-export (Pramod et al. 2014; FAO 2016a).
3.8 Consumers
Consumers mark the end of the seafood supply chain. Local
consumers purchase directly from the fisher or farmer.
Domestic consumers purchase their seafood from retailers
and food service outlets. Foreign consumers purchase their
seafood exported from the UK (Kobayashi et al. 2004;
FAO 2016a).
By the end of the seafood supply chain, the custody of the
product has involved many actors between the fisher, aqua-
culturist and final consumer. Commonly, these include bro-
kers, traders, wholesalers, distributors and other middlemen,
often distant from the consumer and the markets they
supply (Schell et al. 2012; Pramod et al. 2014). Each
actor carries out diverse and variable operations and
functions to achieve a complex range of products dis-
tributed nationally and internationally. This global and
complex nature of the supply chain has been identified
as a risk factor for increased fraudulent opportunity
(Warner et al. 2013; Elliott 2014; Foodfraud.org 2016). It is
therefore imperative to address this risk by identifying and
understanding the types of food fraud and the vulnerable
nodes in the supply chain for their occurrence (Table 1).
Subsequently, mitigation strategies can be implemented as
close as possible to the node of entry (Spink et al. 2016a).
4 Seafood fraud
Seafood fraud is the practice of misleading consumers about
their seafood for financial gain. The literature indicates that
the seafood supply chain is vulnerable to nine types of fraud,
mirroring Young’s Seafood Limited’s nine sins of seafood
(Young’s Seafood 2016) which were acknowledged in the
Elliott Report (2014). They include; species substitution, fish-
ery substitution, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
substitution; species adulteration, chain of custody abuse;
catch method fraud, undeclared product extension, modern
day slavery and animal welfare (Fig. 4).
4.1 Species substitution
Species substitution occurs when a superior, high-value spe-
cies is substituted by an inferior, lower-value species, for ex-
ample cod by whiting. Inter and intra species substitutions are
implemented for economic gain, to satisfy the market demand
that cannot be met through legal routes and to evade border
controls and high tariffs associated with a particular species
(Asensio et al. 2008; Jacquet and Pauly 2008; Ramussen and
Morrissey 2008;Mohanty et al. 2013; Johnson 2014; Jennings
et al. 2016; Nmfs.noaa.gov 2016). As an example,
mislabelling Asian catfish as grouper allowed Sterling
Seafood Co-operation to evade over $60million in federal
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Table 1 Food fraud vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies at nodes in the seafood supply chain
Node in the 
Supply Chain Description Practices Purpose Responsibility
Illegal, unregulated and under reported substitution
Consequence: Fishery Sustainability and Economic Deception
Source Illegal capture of the broodstock or seed from the wild and the 
use of unlicensed or unapproved farmer, capture fisher or vessel
Traceability (origin, health 
certificates, license details) and 
Production records
Product Veracity Internally –Supply 
chain player
Seed Production Unlicensed or unapproved hatchery or nursery operations Verification by Inspection and 
Auditing – including sub-
contractors
System 
Effectiveness
Regulatory, food 
quality and safety 
schemes and customer
Harvesting Exploit quotas and catches undersized fish; harvesting in areas 
closed for harvest, illegal harvesting methods, misreporting of 
catch as lower value species, unlicensed vessels or farms; 
transhipments to flags of convenience
Import and export controls, 
random sampling and analytical 
testing
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Regulatory and border 
controls
Processing Mixing of legally and illegally sourced fish to meet production 
demand and increase profits
Delivery checks, acceptance 
criteria
Product Veracity Customer
Wholesalers, 
Middlemen and
distributors
Illegal seafood is laundered into the supply chain Supplier Approval procedures Product Veracity Customer
Species Substitution
Consequence: Economic deception, Consumer rights and public health threat
Harvesting Fishers or farmers mislabel the seafood Traceability and production 
records including any species 
testing
Product Veracity Internally - Supply 
chain players
Processing Reduces or eliminates the morphological traits used to identify 
the species allowing superior species to be substituted with 
inferior species
Food Management System and 
records
Product Veracity Internally – Supply 
chain players
Storage Intervention and substitution of higher value species with lower 
value species
Verification by Inspection, 
Auditing and random sampling 
with analytical methods
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Regulatory, Quality 
assurance or food 
safety scheme, 
customer
Wholesale, 
middlemen and 
distributors
Price takers who purchase seafood of a lesser price or intervene 
whilst in their care to sell as their higher value relatives
Delivery checks, acceptance 
criteria, analytical testing, 
supplier approval and mock 
traceability exercises
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Customer
Market
- Retailers
- Food Service
Mislabel and sell low quality fish as their superior relatives 
especially in the sale of processed or ready to eat meals which 
lack the morphological traits
Import and export controls and 
random sampling and species 
testing
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Regulatory and border 
controls
Species Adulteration
Consequence: Public Health threat, consumer rights and economic deception
Seed Production The use of banned or higher than prescribed additive to achieve 
superior production of seed
Traceability and Production 
records
Product Veracity Internally – supply 
chain player
On-growing 
Operations
The use of undeclared, banned or higher than allowed additives 
to achieve superior growth and quality
Food Management System Product Veracity Processor
Processing The use of non-declared additives or species to a primary 
processed material to extend the product or introduce a raw 
material of dubious or prohibited origin, boost appearance and 
quality
Verification by Inspection 
including random analytical 
testing
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Regulatory, Food 
quality or safety 
schemes, Customers
Wholesale, 
middlemen and 
distributors
The use of undeclared or banned additives to extend shelf-life 
and boost quality
Import and export controls 
including random sampling and 
analytical testing
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Regulatory and border 
control
Market
- Collector and 
auction markets
The use of undeclared or banned additives to extend shelf-life 
and boost quality
Delivery checks, supplier 
approval and mock traceability 
exercises
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Customer
Request traceability information 
and whistleblowing
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Consumer
Modern Day Slavery
Consequence: Consumer rights and economic deception
Source Employee’s rights, wage and working conditions are below the 
legal requirement. If this activity goes undetected, it deceives the 
consumer and the reduced expenditure allows financial gain. It is 
Employee Policy and Procedure Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Supply chain player
Seed production exacerbated when seafood travels through intermediary countries 
and is challenging to track.
Contingency Plans, with 
approved companies for sub-
contracted work
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Supply chain player
On-growing 
Operations
Verification by Inspection and 
Auditing
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Regulatory, third party 
certification scheme or 
customer
Harvesting Delivery checks and supplier 
approval requiring verification of 
ethical trade
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Customer
Processing
Storage
Wholesale, 
middlemen and 
distributors
Mock traceability exercises to 
track the product and verify its 
routes through regulated and 
approved companies
System 
Effectiveness
Customer, regulatory 
and third party auditors
Market
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Table 1 (continued)
Animal Welfare
Consequence: Economic deception and consumers rights
Seed Production
and Ongrowing 
Operations
Animals may be subject to conditions which threaten their 
welfare such as unnecessary pain, injury or suffering or 
experience unacceptable environments, feeding regime and 
space
Traceability, production and 
storage records
Product Veracity Supply chain players
Harvesting and 
Storage
Verification by inspection and 
auditing
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Regulatory, Third party 
certification scheme, 
customer
Wholesale, 
middlemen and 
distributors to
Market
Delivery checks, acceptance 
criteria and supplier approval
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Customer
Fishery Substitution
Consequence: Economic deception, consumers rights and public health threat
Harvesting Fishers or farmers lie about the origin of the seafood on landing Traceability, production and 
distribution records including 
license details
Product Veracity Supply chain players
Processing Mislabel the origin to that of a superior reputation Food management system and 
records
Product Veracity Processor
Wholesale, 
middlemen and 
distributors
Intervene, mislabel, advertise and/or sell the seafood to that of a 
superior value or one which will allows evasion of border 
controls
Verification by inspection, 
auditing and analytical methods
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Regulatory, food 
quality and safety 
schemes, Customer
Import and export controls 
including random sampling and 
analytical testing
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Border Control and 
regulatory
Market
- Food Service
Mislabelling or advertising of catch or farm origin to one of a 
superior reputation
Delivery checks, acceptance 
criteria, supplier approval and 
mock traceability exercises
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Customer
Chain of Custody Abuse
Consequence: Economic deception, consumers rights
Harvesting Mixing of product with certificates or origin or documentation 
during transhipment and the falsification of traceability 
information
Traceability, production and 
storage records
Product Veracity Supply chain player
Processing Labelling and advertising a product with a premium credence 
claim of consumer value issues
Food Integrity Management 
System and records
Product Veracity Processor
Storage The mixing of product without certificates of origin or 
traceability documentation during storage
Verification by Inspection, 
auditing and mock traceability 
exercises
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Regulatory, Third party 
auditors or customer
Wholesale, 
middlemen and 
distributors
Advertising a product with a premium claim of consumer value 
issues and mixing product without certification and traceability 
documentation
Delivery checks, supplier 
approval and mock traceability 
exercises with 100% 
reconciliation
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Customer
Market
Retailers and 
Food Service
Advertising and labelling product with credence claims of 
consumer value
Import and export controls, 
random sampling and analytical 
testing
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Regulatory and border 
controls
Catch Method Fraud
Consequence: Economic deception and consumer’s rights
Harvesting Mislabelling the type of production or harvesting method Licencing, traceability and 
production records
Product Veracity Internally – Supply 
Chain player
Wholesale, 
middlemen and 
distributors
Inspection, auditing and random 
analytical testing
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Regulatory, food 
quality or safety 
schemes, customer
Market
- Collectors and 
auction
- Food Service
Supplier approval, delivery 
checks, acceptance criteria, 
approved suppliers list including 
random analytical testing
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Customer
Request traceability 
documentation and 
whistleblowing
System
Effectiveness
Consumer
Undeclared product Extension
Consequence: Economic deception, consumers rights
Processing The use of technology to misrepresent and increase the perceived 
weight of the seafood content, thus increasing its value
Traceability, production, 
analytical testing records
Product Veracity Supply Chain Player
Verification by inspection 
auditing and analytical tests
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Regulatory, food 
quality and safety 
schemes, Customer
Delivery checks, approved 
suppliers list and testing
Product Veracity 
and System 
Effectiveness
Customer
Table 1 identifies and explains the nodes in the seafood supply chain at which each type of seafood fraud can occur. The current practices for mitigation,
purpose and responsibility are also assigned in order to contribute to Food Fraud Mitigation
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tariffs and sell over $500,000 of the misbranded fish at four
times its typical price (Warner et al. 2013; Lou 2015).
Similarly, Lou (2015) revealed how one forensic scientist at
the National Oceanographic Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) has seen more than 2,000 disguised catfish fillets
and an increasing number of mislabelled species approaching
half a million pounds per shipment over his 18 years.
Conversely, NOAA has fewer than 100 inspectors throughout
the US coastline, a number which continues to decline with
diminishing federal funding. Thus only 1% of imported sea-
food in the US is reportedly inspected for mislabelling, despite
the fact that 90% of the imported fish originates from coun-
tries with inferior regulations, such as Thailand, Indonesia,
China and Vietnam (Lou 2015). It is therefore unsurprising
that seafood substitution is reported to be widespread within
the global marketplace (Roos et al. 2007; Triantafyllidis et al.
2010; Mohanty et al. 2013; Stamatis et al. 2015; Warner et al.
2016) at rates ranging from 25-50% in broad retail market
surveys (Jacquet and Pauly 2008; Wong and Hanner 2008;
Buck 2010; Heyden et al. 2010; Hanner et al. 2011;
Hellberg and Morrissey 2011; Cawthorn et al. 2012; Warner
et al. 2013) and 25-60% in commonly substituted species such
as red snapper, wild salmon and Atlantic cod (Marko et al.
2004; Consumer Reports 2006; Miller and Mariani 2010).
Oceana released the most comprehensive review of publica-
tions on seafood mislabelling. They examined over 200 peer-
Fig. 4 The nine sins of seafood
involves three separate categories:
adulteration including species
substitution, adulteration and
undeclared product extension;
provenance comprising of fishery
substitution and chain of custody
abuse and ethical trade consisting
of illegal, unregulated and under
reported substitution, catch
method fraud and animal welfare
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reviewed journal articles, popular media sources and public
documents from governments and NGOs covering 55 coun-
tries and over 25,000 samples on every continent except
Antarctica (Warner et al. 2016). The review concluded that
nearly one in every five samples tested worldwide was
mislabelled. Moreover, fraud was found at every level of the
seafood supply chain. However the majority of studies (80%)
were conducted at the retail level, such as restaurants and
grocery stores. In addition, the published research tends to
be low in the hierarchy of scientific evidence in terms of
how the sampling was undertaken, the sample numbers re-
cruited and the rationale for such investigations. Thus the level
of confidence and validity of these figures are questionable
and resultant figures reflect the sampling population rather
than the entire population. Similarly, a court case requires
enforcement officers to proactively recognise and identify
the latest seafood fraud in order to bring a batch of species
to forensics. An inaccurate suspicion results in wasted lab time
and refunds to the importer. In addition, some mislabelling
may result from human error in identifying fish or their origin
rather than fraud. Nevertheless, the literature indicates substi-
tution exists within the seafood supply chain. This is facilitat-
ed by the fact that seafood is a highly traded commodity with a
very diverse range of closely related and visually similar spe-
cies which undergo procedures and processing, reducing or
eliminating the morphological traits used for identification,
such as heading, filleting or value-added processing (Pineiro
et al. 2001; Marko et al. 2004; Chen et al. 2012; Mohanty et al.
2013; Jennings et al. 2016; Tagliavia et al. 2016). This
coupled with the fact that seafood has become a limited re-
source and experiences price pressures, provides a substantial
market for substitution and mislabeling within the industry
(Jacquet and Pauly 2008; Miller and Mariani 2010; Heyden
et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2012; Galal-Khallaf et al. 2014; Hurst
et al. 2014; Mueller et al. 2015; Stamatis et al. 2015;Warner et
al. 2016).
Worryingly, seafood substitution poses a significant public
health threat associated with the exposure to allergenic foods
and fish with high toxicity and contaminants in the substituted
species (Pascual et al. 2008; Sheth et al. 2010; Triantafyllidis
et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2012; Stamatis et al. 2015). One such
case involved pufferfish, (Lagocephalus scleratus) which
contains a potentially deadly neurotoxin, tetrodotoxin, being
mislabeled as monkfish to lower the cost of production and
evade import and other restrictions (Johnson 2014). However,
this mislabeled pufferfish caused paralysis of the respiratory
muscles and death in a number of consumers (Noguchi and
Arakawa 2008; Islam et al. 2011; Curll 2015; Luekasemsuk et
al. 2015). Disturbingly, more than half (58%) of samples
substituted for other seafood are with species that pose health
risks to consumers (Warner et al. 2016). Consequently, con-
sumers could be unwittingly eating fish that could make them
sick. Recent media reports revealed; BFried Cabbage sold as
crispy seaweed^ BCrab substituted with seafood sticks^,
BReformed whitefish with very little or no scampi sold as
scampi, ^ B82% of the 200 grouper, perch and sword fish
samples tested in Italy mislabeled,^ (Whitworth 2016), BIn
Brazil, 55% of Bshark^ were actually large tooth sawfish^,
B98% of the 69 Bluefin tuna tested in Brussels restaurants
were another species^, BIn 2015, a German study found about
half of the samples sold as Bsole^ to be lower value fish upon
testing^, BIn 2015, a Santa Monica restaurant was charged for
selling the endangered sei whale as fatty tuna^ (Warner et al.
2016) and, BRestaurant busted for passing off Escolar for
white tuna^ (Weinsier 2016).
Species substitution can occur at numerous stages through-
out the seafood supply chain (Table 1), particularly prevalent
in the chain of higher priced fish. It has been associated with
fishers who mislabel the seafood and, more commonly, after
they are purchased from the fishers by ‘price-takers’. The
price for certain fish can be high due to resource scarcity.
Therefore distributors, retailers and other final seafood cus-
tomers (such as fish mongers) often buy fish of a lesser price
and illegally sell these fish as their higher value relatives for
the sake of increased profits (Jacquet and Pauly 2008). In
particular, foodservice companies, e.g. restaurants and
takeaways, have been associated with species substitution
(Filonzi et al. 2010; Hanner et al. 2011; Miller et al. 2012;
Lamendin et al. 2014; Stamatis et al. 2015; Jennings et al.
2016; Warner et al. 2016). In these outlets, the act can go
undetected as the prepared dishes lack morphological charac-
ters, there is less stringent labelling and the inspections by
food control authorities typically focus on samples taken from
storage rather than the prepared dishes (Hurst et al. 2014;
Kappel and Schroder 2015). Similarly, the availability of proc-
essed fish products such as fillets, fish fingers, and other proc-
essed foods eliminate the diagnostic traits creating additional
opportunities (Mohanty et al. 2013). Moreover, as primary
and secondary processed fish is increasingly used as raw ma-
terials for novel products, such as protein powder, the modern
day supply chain is becoming increasingly opaque and com-
plex and introducing significant challenges to traceability and
food safety. This is especially concerning as species substitu-
tion at one point along the supply chain can pose health risks
that are far-reaching in terms of allergy and toxicity and are
potentially untraceable.
4.2 Fishery substitution
Fishery substitution is the substitution of a product from a
fishery with a Bbad^ or inferior reputation to a Bgood^ repu-
tation (Elliott 2014). For example, substituting North Sea Cod
for Icelandic Cod which has a better reputation for sustainabil-
ity and can sell for a superior price or, shellfish harvested from
a ‘Class C’ or closed site may be reported as a ‘Class A’ bed to
avoid deputation or destruction of stock. This poses a
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particular public health risk as the substituted shellfish is from
polluted waterbodies with high levels of E. coli. Fishery
Substitution is prohibited in European Regulation, which re-
quires the catch area (if caught) or country of origin (if farmed/
cultivated) to be specified (European Commission 2000;
European Commission 2001). Its consequences incorporate
not only economic deception, industry issues and impacts to
consumer rights, but also a public health risk associated with
disease, contaminants or toxicity related to the seafood’s ori-
gin which may go unchecked due to mislabelling. For exam-
ple, Fukushima (2016) reported an incident were potentially
radiation tainted seafood, from the 2011 earthquake and tsu-
nami, was smuggled from Fukushima, Japan into China. The
report described how 5,000 tonnes of expensive seafood such
as king crabs and scallops, worth a total of 230 million yuan
($34.7million USD) had been illegally imported by a compa-
ny based in Shandong province and sold across the country
over 2 years. Fishery substitution can occur at numerous
points along the seafood supply chain similar to species sub-
stitution. It can be implemented by the fishers who mislabel
the seafood, but more commonly after purchase by distribu-
tors, middlemen and food service companies. This method of
fraud is commonly used to avoid foreign duties when foreign
producers may ship seafood products en route to the UK
through a third country to avoid import duties and regulatory
controls (e.g. import alerts) by labelling the product’s country
of origin as the third country.
4.3 Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
substitution
Illegal, unreported and unregulated substitution includes sea-
food which has been farmed or caught over quota or in areas
closed for harvest, the harvesting of undersized fish, the illegal
setting of traps, the misreporting of catch as lower value spe-
cies (e.g. pink salmon reported as chum salmon) and the use of
unlicensed vessels or farms (Borit and Olsen 2012; Pramod et
al. 2014). This fraudulent activity allows brokers to enhance
profits and amalgamate supplies from different sources to
achieve their orders in a fully exploited and limited resource
market (Gayo and Hale 2007; Pramod et al. 2014). It has been
described as Bof serious and increasing concern^ (FAO 2001;
Borit and Olsen 2012), with 10% of the total value of fish and
fish product imports to the European Union estimated to orig-
inate from IUU fishing (Borit and Olsen 2012). IUU fishing is
facilitated by nations that provide flags of convenience, re-
laxed import and export regulations, the thousands of fishing
boats which employ fishing practices that would be illegal in
their home nations and the lack of transparency and traceabil-
ity when supplies are consolidated during trans-shipping and
sold at sea. Consequently, even products carrying a traceabil-
ity package, may potentially derive from mixed shipments
with mixed species fished by a mix of licensed and blacklisted
vessels (Jacquet and Pauly 2008; Borit and Olsen 2012).
These traceability issues are exacerbated when companies
own fishing vessels in another country and register it under a
different national company or flag (Pramod et al. 2014).
Additionally, the global nature of the supply chain where
products are transported through one or more intermediary
countries for post-harvest processing and subsequent re-
export provides multiple opportunities for the mixing of legal-
ly and illegally sourced fish, where the illegals are essentially
‘laundered’ in the processing countries and subsequently enter
international trade as a ‘legal’ product of the exporting nation
(Pramod et al. 2014). For example, many Russian vessels are
reported to illegally overharvest crab or capture crab by ves-
sels without a quota share or license. They then transship these
catches to flags of convenience or switch off their vehicle
management system and land the illegal crab in Japan or
Korea, were it is processed and consumed, or provided with
counterfeit Certificates of Origin and Health. The crab is then
shipped to China for repackaging (sometimes including re-
processing), where it may be mixed with legal crab, before
export. The fraud goes undetected due to false documentation,
repacking and obfuscation of traceability (Pramod et al. 2014).
Since 2001, the European Union has introduced legal provi-
sions and funded research aimed at tracing seafood and miti-
gating against IUU fishing. In 2008, they enhanced legislation
and stipulated catch documentation requirements for all
imported and exported seafood, a third country carding pro-
cess that imposes import restrictions on countries that are not
actively addressing IUU fishing, and, penalties for EU na-
tionals who engage or support IUU fishing around the world.
Additional provisions went into effect in 2012 and 2014
which required even more stringent traceability and mandato-
ry labelling requirements from catch or harvest to the retail
level. A preliminary analysis of studies on seafood fraud car-
ried out before and after this legislation has indicated that rates
of fraud have decreased (Warner et al. 2016). While these
provisions have increased fisheries’ control and transparency
of seafood information, the limitations of the data prevent any
definitive conclusion and certain weaknesses in the scope,
implementation and information available to consumers
means the opportunity for IUU fishing remain. For example,
certain seafood are exempt from provisions: most processed or
prepared food (i.e. cooked, steamed, breaded, fried or mari-
nated), several types of aquatic invertebrates (e.g. jelly fish)
and canned seafood. Also excluded from the legislation is the
food service sector of the supply chain (e.g. restaurants, take-
away, schools and catering enterprises). These are all points in
the seafood supply chain where fraud incidents are prevalent
(Warner et al. 2016). In addition, some studies did not show
markedly lower mislabeling rates even in places and for prod-
ucts covered by EU provisions.
Ultimately, IUU supplies can enter the seafood supply
chain where there is a lack of transparency and accountability.
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These gaps in the system occur at sea during fishing, harvest-
ing or trans-shipment operations, where the fisherman’s activ-
ities are restricted by quotas and other regulations and, where
monitoring and surveillance remain inadequate; in ports at
landing, where systems to document catch landings are often
non-transparent, and; in onshore distribution chains and mar-
ket countries, where the seafood is mixed in crates incorporat-
ing fish from different vessels and catches. This is exacerbated
in distribution chains and countries which lack effective trace-
ability and proof of origin systems, such as China, Japan and
Canada which are major seafood exporters and importers
(Jacquet and Pauly 2008; Borit and Olsen 2012). The
sustained opportunity for IUU substitution is particularly
concerning in the seafood industry as it depletes global stocks,
destroys marine habitats, distorts competition, and threatens
communities that depend on seafood for food and the liveli-
hoods of legitimate fishermen (Borit and Olsen 2012; Pramod
et al. 2014).
4.4 Species adulteration
Species adulteration is the addition of a non-declared, non-
specified species to a primary processed raw material, e.g.
adding a lower value species such as Coley or Saithe to high
value frozen block of Atlantic Cod or the wrong types of
prawn to adulterate and extend a scampi core. The motivation
for this type of seafood fraud is exploitation of the consider-
able price difference between different species, or to introduce
a raw material of dubious or prohibited origin into the supply
chain. Seafood can be adulterated with additives and
chemicals such as fertilizers, pesticides, antibiotics, hormones,
veterinary drugs, colorants and preservatives to increase either
production or food quality or ‘hide’ other types of seafood
fraud (Zhang and Cai 2006; Mohanty et al. 2013; Ortega et
al. 2014; Rahman et al. 2016). The presence of these com-
pounds may have detrimental effects on human health
(Mohanty et al. 2013). For example, Malachite green (and
methylene blue) are not permitted veterinary treatments but
are reportedly used illegally as effective and low cost anti-
fungal agents in fresh water systems (Mohanty et al. 2013;
Ortega et al. 2014). Prolonged consumption can cause inflam-
mation, ulceration and necrosis of the linings of the mouth,
throat and gastrointestinal tract and may cause cancers and
other conditions e.g. childhood asthma and skin diseases with
chronic exposure (Wooster et al. 2005; Tang et al. 2009;
Rahman et al. 2016). In Italy, bleaching seafood in a mixture
of water and hydrogen peroxide to make fish seem whiter,
fresher and more attractive to the consumer has been reported,
yet it’s a violation of EU law (TheLocal 2016).
Species adulteration has been reported throughout the sup-
ply chain, particularly on the farm during primary production,
processing and handling stages and during transport (Gale and
Buzby 2009; Mohanty et al. 2013; Ortega et al. 2014).
4.5 Chain of custody abuse
Chain of custody is the chronological documentation
which states the seizure, custody, control, transfer, anal-
ysis and disposition of evidence. This documentation is
required as part of traceability procedures and certifica-
tion processes (e.g. eco-labels or Marine Council
Stewardship certification) (Borit and Olsen 2012;
Miret-Pastor et al. 2014; Pramod et al. 2014). The fal-
sification of this documentation allows financial gain
from premium Bcredence claims^ of Bconsumer value
issues^ such as, farming systems, species, and prove-
nance claims on the packaging of seafood of a lesser
purported value (Mohanty et al. 2013; Pramod et al.
2014; Curll 2015). There is a sustained opportunity for
chain of custody abuse due to the global and complex
nature of the seafood chain, comprised of many actors
and activities ranging from fishers and aqua-culturists,
transhipments, distributors, warehouse owners, whole-
salers, retailers, brokers, large trading companies in dif-
ferent countries, and, others, all capable of abusing and
tampering with the traceability documentation (Pramod
et al. 2014). This has overwhelmed regulatory authori-
ties and made sharing of information through the supply
chain inconsistent and difficult (Yasuda and Bowen
2006). Even information on coastal harvesting environ-
ments is largely unaddressed, with the exception of
shellfish. Import health authorities, food safety officers
or customs authorities do not have full access to infor-
mation pertaining to the origins, trans-shipment points
and activities associated with the product. This limited
communication between regulatory authorities at multi-
ple independent inspection points allows less precise
information about the background of the products fur-
ther along the chain, with the end consumer knowing
very little (Pramod et al. 2014; Yasuda and Bowen
2006). Record keeping can be time-consuming, chal-
lenging and beyond the skills of the individuals in-
volved relying on methods and technologies that have
remain unchanged for decades. Consequently, the ability
to effectively and reliably trace consignments of seafood
throughout all supply chains in a consistent manner is chal-
lenging (Charlebois et al. 2014; Ringsberg 2014; Leal et al.
2015; D’Amico et al. 2016). Incidences of chain of custody
abuse have been reported. For example Chien-hua and Chung
(2016) reported how a Kaohsiung seafood firm sold
NT$700m (US $21.83million) of expired products in the past
three years to restaurants and traditional markets in Taiwan by
removing expiry dates from packaging and re-shelling old
shrimp to mask the freshness. In another report by Chen and
Chao-fu (2016) over 51 tonnes of expired, unlabelled and
frozen soft-shell shrimp, squid and lumpfish were seized from
two companies by Kaohsiung authorities.
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4.6 Catch method fraud
Catch method fraud involves the mislabelling or advertising
of the type of production or harvesting method to increase the
financial return. For example, line caught fish attract a higher
market value than trawled fish so may be mislabelled to
achieve a higher market price. Likewise, the consumer views
the ‘wild’ species as a superior standard than the farmed spe-
cies, attracting a higher price. A UK study involving 100
samples from retailers, identified that 15% of ‘wild’ salmon,
11% of ‘wild’ sea bream and 10% of ‘wild’ sea bass were
actually farmed and not wild as claimed (Jacquet and Pauly
2008). This fraudulent activity is commonly performed at the
processing and manufacturing supply chain stages by agents,
middlemen or final retail customer before sale to the
consumer.
4.7 Undeclared product extension
Undeclared product extension involves the use of technology
by processors to increase the perceived weight of the seafood
content and thus the economic return. Typical practices in-
clude: over treating, (e.g. over-breading or over-glazing),
soaking fish in a brine solution, injecting undeclared chemical
additives to increase the muscles water holding capacity, or
injection of fish by-products (minced up and blended) back
into the fillet to bring up the weight (Jennings et al. 2016).
Undeclared product extension has been reported as a
common practice, which may pose a public health threat
(Nmfs.noaa.gov 2016). For example, in China there have been
reports of the injection of gelatin like chemicals, derived from
animal skins and bones, into prawns and shrimp. The
chemicals resemble their natural colour and increase the
weight by 20-30% and allow wholesalers to increase their
price. This subjects the consumer to uncertain health
threats associated with long-term ingestion of unknown
chemicals and industrial substances in this economic fraud
(Wu et al. 2013).
4.8 Modern Day Slavery
Modern day slavery is a crime which describes a situation
when someone is forced to work by ownership or control of
an ‘employer’ through mental or physical threat or abuse,
dehumanised when treated as a commodity or physically
constrained on freedom of movement (Antislavery.org 2016;
Modern Slavery Act 2015). It is illegal in all countries
throughout the world. Food produced using high standards
of human welfare is considered a quality attribute by con-
sumers, enhancing brand reputation, competitive advantage
and price premium. Therefore, fraudulent claims and unde-
tected modern day slavery in the food supply chain deceives
the consumer and allows financial gain from the reduced
expenditure on wages and health and safety procedures.
Worryingly, the scale of hidden human exploitation is signif-
icant and involves thousands of people internationally, some
supply chains of which are known to support UK consump-
tion (Elliott 2014). In particular, the seafood supply chain has
been accused of exhibiting modern day slavery and exposure
of employees to a greater risk of injury, death and human right
abuses compared to other jobs (Ratner et al. 2014; Couper et
al. 2015; Jennings et al. 2016). For instance, Roberts et al.
(2010), reported 1039 fatalities from 1948 to 2008 on UK
fishing vessels which were unstable, overloaded and unsea-
worthy. Another report described how 23 out of 38 illegal
immigrants fromChina died inMorecambe Bay in 2004 when
drowned by a rising tide whilst collecting cockles
(Cerastoderma edule, Cardiidae) due to an employer motivat-
ed by avarice and minimal regard for employee safety
(Jennings et al. 2016). In 2012, the UK Serious and
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) reported 74 potential vic-
tims of illegal, bonded and forced labour in fisheries (SOCA
2013) through abuse of an immigration concession (transit
visas) for seamen to facilitate the potential victims’ entry into
the UK. A subsequent report noted that fishermen continue to
find employment in the UK via agencies in the Philippines
and Ghana, but are not paid the originally contracted wages
and experience poor working conditions on arrival (National
Crime Agency 2014). Furthermore, raids by SOCA in both
England and Scotland have led to at least 50 exploited fisher-
men being freed from fishing boats. The aquaculture sector
has been described as a safer occupation than working in wild
capture, but the relative fatality rates are still high with 5 fatal
accidents from 2003 to 2013 in the Scottish aquaculture in-
dustry (Health and Safety Executive 2014). The complex and
internationalised nature of the seafood supply chains makes it
particularly difficult to track a component to an end product of
a particular producer, and hence, challenging to certify social
welfare and ethics (Antislavery.org 2016). Abuse of human
welfare is more likely to occur when customers give their
supplier a large order with a short turn around beyond their
capacity, forcing the supplier to subcontract work to factories
or workers that are not regulated by the same standards.When
buyers negotiate such low prices there is an increased
likelihood of suppliers to reduce the price it pays for
materials, production and wages, encouraging the use of
forced labour. Consequently, a number of government
and independent initiatives have developed standards to
promote responsible supply chain activities, particularly,
labour rights, health and safety, the environment and
business ethics (Modern Slavery Act 2015; Ethical Trading
Initiative 2016; Jennings et al. 2016; Marine Stewardship
Council 2016; Seafish 2016). Ultimately, companies
should assume responsibility and actively ensure no
forced labour has been used throughout the supply chain of
their retail products.
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4.9 Animal welfare
Food authenticity experts have revealed a Bnew unconven-
tional fraud^ relating to the sale of food with valuable animal
welfare marketing claims, such as BAnimal Friendly^ (Curll
2015; ScienceDaily 2016). For many consumers, animal wel-
fare is an important aspect relating to their food choice. This
offers an opportunity for competitive advantage and increased
market value. However, it can be challenging to standardise
and prove a seafood product has experienced all the require-
ments for welfare, including a suitable environment and diet,
to exhibit normal behaviour patterns and be housed with or
apart from other animals, and to be protected from unneces-
sary pain, injury, suffering and disease (Jennings et al. 2016).
Therefore animal welfare of seafood can be undermined at any
stage in the supply chain from primary production to its
slaughter.
In the wild capture fisheries, welfare becomes an issue
from the moment the fish encounter the fishing gear.
Animals either die as a consequence of the harvesting process
(Metcalfe 2009) or, enter the fishing vessel alive, especially in
the case of high-value fish and where flesh quality is of pri-
mary concern. The time to death can vary from minutes to
hours to days and each animal can experience different gear
specific trauma (Jennings et al. 2016). During harvesting,
some fish may escape or be discarded at sea. For those not
already dead, they may subsequently die from trauma or pre-
dation, while others may recover and survive (Jennings et al.
2016). Though nothing is known about sub-lethal effects on
growth, predation and reproduction of these fish.
In aquaculture, welfare is an issue throughout the supply
chain, to the point of slaughter. Stocking density, water qual-
ity, diet, feeding techniques, husbandry practices and manage-
ment procedures all affect welfare prior to death (Boujard et al.
2002; Ashley 2007; Jennings et al. 2016). Recently, more
humane slaughter methods have been utilised for fish. For
example, automated percussive systems or electric stunning
systems have been developed to stun fish immediately
allowing them to die without regaining consciousness (Robb
and Kestin 2002; Lines et al. 2003; Jennings et al. 2016). As
with fish, crustaceans, are thought to encounter uncomfortable
experiences during their capture and death, particularly during
their live storage and transport. Similar techniques, such as
electric stunning prior to processing have been used to reduce
unnecessary abuse to their welfare (Elwood et al. 2009; Neil
2010; Roth and Oines 2010; Jennings et al. 2016).
Ultimately, seafood species from aquaculture or wild fish-
eries may be exposed to unnecessary pain through their envi-
ronment, capture, harvest, transport and slaughter. Similarly,
welfare claims may be used as a tactical marketing ploy to
gain from the good publicity of the labelling. For example,
Brown (2005) exposed one distinct case were canned tunawas
labelled as ‘dolphin-safe’ despite the fact that the species,
skipjack tuna, is not implicated in the dolphin by-catch prob-
lem. This is misleading to the consumer and relates to current
concerns regarding transparent labelling. Ultimately, the cur-
rent regulation is limiting in terms of how fish are handled or
killed or what constitutes as acceptable animal welfare stan-
dards and labelling. The current trends in public attitudes to
human and animal welfare suggest that these issues relating to
seafood welfare are likely to become more visible in the UK.
Moreover, it is evident that active certification schemes are
targeting such ethical issues (Jennings et al. 2016).
5 Current status
Seafood fraud remains a serious problem. Every node in the
supply chain offers an opportunity for one or more of the nine
sins of seafood (Table 1). Each of these sins encompass eco-
nomic, sustainability, consumer choice and/or public health
consequences. It is imperative these fraudulent opportunities
are considered in food management procedures. The increas-
ing complexity of the supply chain requires more robust mea-
sures in terms of auditing, traceability and testing in order to
protect the supply chain and its consumers (Folinas et al. 2006;
Ringsberg 2014; Lidskog et al. 2015; Black et al. 2016). The
United Kingdom (UK) has recognised these food fraud issues.
To date in the UK there have been limited high profile media
reports, research publications and public health incidents re-
lated to seafood fraud. Nonetheless, there is a strong commit-
ment from the industry and government to improve the integ-
rity and assurance of food supply networks and a determina-
tion to protect UK consumers. This commitment is reinforced
by the government funded review of the food supply chain
which states that BUK consumers have access to perhaps the
safest food in the world^ and provides recommendations for
the UK government to address Food Fraud (Elliott 2014;
Spink et al. 2016b). Likewise, the European Commission
has been addressing Food Fraud within the Food Integrity
focus areas (European Parliament 2013). The Commission
has instigated preventative initiatives, including the Food
Fraud Network of Government agencies sharing information
and intelligence on incidents, the expansion of the Rapid Alert
System for Food and Feed (RASSF) for food recall to include
Badulteration and fraud^ and a 12 million Euro Food Integrity
Project (Spink et al. 2016b). In addition, there is a range of
industry and non-government activities relating to food fraud
continuing to surface such as GFSI and BRC which require
food fraud vulnerability assessment as part of their food man-
agement standards. However, there is no room for complacen-
cy. The implementation of these networks and increased focus
on fraudulent opportunities and inspection of practices has
uncovered incidences in other meat sectors such as the poultry
sector in the UK with the recent unveiling of events occurring
within the 2 Sisters Food Group. Therefore, although the UK
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reputation is promising, it does not mean seafood fraud does
not exist in the supply chain. It may be the result of data
limitations and insufficient testing. Moreover, the opportuni-
ties, which continue to exist, mean the UK supply is still vul-
nerable to food fraud and its consequences, particularly eco-
nomic costs. It is therefore imperative to construct and insti-
gate a mitigation plan which deters food fraud to protect the
UK’s reputation for food safety and to promote the interests of
honest and hardworking food businesses (Elliott 2014).
6 Food fraud mitigation
In order to mitigate food fraud there is a need to examine
motivation and opportunity. The factors that influence fraud-
ulent opportunity have included, pressure, differentiated into
personal (individual e.g. financial or social pressure), employ-
ment (corporate or management derived pressure) and exter-
nal pressure (business or stakeholder pressure to incur finan-
cial return, social environmental and market price pressure)
(Gbegi and Adebisi 2013; Kleboth et al. 2016); opportunity to
commit fraud, influenced by the extent of formal control sys-
tems (countermeasures) and/or the potential for weaknesses or
gaps in the business network (Gbegi and Adebisi 2013;
Tähkäpää et al. 2015; Kleboth et al. 2016; Manning et al.
2016); rationalisation, the ability of the individual to assess
their behaviour as acceptable, if excusable to themselves or
others (Gbegi and Adebisi 2013; Kleboth et al. 2016;
Manning et al. 2016; TiFSiP 2016), the lack of a strong deter-
rent i.e. penalties (Tähkäpää et al. 2015; Manning et al. 2016;
TiFSiP 2016); capability, the power or ability to undertake the
fraud (Wolfe and Hermanson 2004; Gbegi and Adebisi 2013),
the motivation or benefit of undertaking the fraud (e.g. guar-
anteed economic benefit) (Canter 2000; Williams 2001;
Dennis and Kelly 2013; Smith and Laing 2013; Spink et al.
2013; Elliott 2014; Spink et al. 2014; Tähkäpää et al. 2015;
Manning et al. 2016), and the personal integrity or category of
offender (Canter 2000;Williams 2001; Smith and Laing 2013;
Spink et al. 2013, 2014; Manning et al. 2016). A number of
academics have attempted to construct models to illustrate
these factors. Spink and Moyer (2011) used the crime triangle
consisting of the victim, the guardian and the hurdle gaps as
the three elements of fraud. Gbegi and Adebisi (2013) defined
the factors for fraud using the fraud triangle consisting of
pressure, opportunity and rationalisation. Wolfe and
Hermanson (2004) suggested the fraud diamond model
consisting of capability, opportunity, realisation and
pressure. Gbegi and Adebisi (2013) modified this to capabil-
ity, opportunity, rationalisation and pressure and Kleboth et al.
(2016) advanced this again to capability, opportunity, motiva-
tion and personal integrity. The overarching theme revealed
from this literature is that fraud takes place because the dis-
honest minority exploit process and system vulnerabilities.
Therefore, good practice involves reducing the number of
opportunities this dishonest minority can exploit (TiFSiP
2016; Spink et al. 2016a). Similarly, the literature proposes
various methods to achieve this. These fall under the themes
of ‘practices’, ‘evidence’, ‘awareness and targeted education’
and ‘governance’. These factors, models and mitigation strat-
egies suggested in the literature have informed the basis of the
Fig. 5 The food integrity matrix interlinked to the nine sins of seafood
fraud and key categories for mitigation. Food integrity is threatened by
four elements; unintentional food quality and safety issues and intentional
food defense and fraud incidents. These are stand-alone entities by
definition but interlink as they create uncertainties to each of the other
elements. A food integrity management system consisting of HACCP,
VACCP and TACCP will help identify the critical control points to
assure food integrity. The matrix is integrated with the nine sins of
seafood and the key categories of practices, evidence gathering,
awareness and governance crucial for mitigation
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conceptual model to address seafood fraud developed in this
study (Fig. 5).
6.1 Practices
Food fraud can be prevented by making food production,
manufacture, retail and food service environments hostile
and difficult for the offender to operate in (NFCU 2016). In
order to achieve this, practices, also known as countermea-
sures, are assigned to the production process and supply chain
for detection and deterrence. In order to assign practices a risk-
based approach is advocated by private label owners (e.g.
BRC, IFS and FSSC 22000), international institutions (e.g.
FAO) and EU legislation (European Commission 2007 (No.
834/2007); EU Regulation 178/2002; European Union 2014).
This risk-based approach is advantageous as it concentrates
resources on the critical points in the food chain, which pose
the highest risk (FAO 2016b; Kleboth et al. 2016). However,
this approach has also been criticised for its reactive nature,
focusing on historic or existing knowledge. The literature ex-
presses the need to predict important medium-long term issues
to allow effective preventative action (FAO 2016b; Kleboth et
al. 2016). In response, research publications (Lalonde and
Boiral 2012; Aven 2016; Kleboth et al. 2016; Marvin et al.
2016; Spink et al. 2016b), government and regulatory guid-
ance (FAO 2016b; PAS 96 2014; SSAFE 2015; FSA 2016;
NSF International 2014; TiFSiP 2016; USP 2014) and inter-
national standards (e.g. BRC and COSO) provide guidance on
the steps to eliminate these opportunities. A synthesis of these
methodologies reveal themes which coincide with the stages
in the vulnerability analysis critical control point (VACCP)
tool i.e. intelligence gathering, preliminary steps, vulnerability
assessment, mitigation strategies, monitoring, verification and
responsibility. This VACCP approach, is advocated in numer-
ous scientific publications, government and industry reports
(Curll 2015), Foodfraud.msu.org (2016), The food fraud think
tank and the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) Position
paper on food fraud (GFSI 2014) and the British Retail
Consortium (BRC) Global Standard for Food Safety version
7 (BRC 2015). This tactic is advantageous as it is based on
fundamental criminology and crime scene theories, whereby
the focus is on reducing the opportunity rather than the nu-
merous types of fraud, and offending personnel and organiza-
tions (Spink et al. 2016a). Moreover, it is based on the already
internationally accepted hazard analysis and critical control
point (HACCP) concept, but introduces the term vulnerability
to food control. It allows the industry to understand the fraud-
ulent opportunity and how it manifests itself and reduces loss
and enhances business image to customers. VACCP also sup-
ports the work of the National Food Crime Unit in England,
Wales and Northern Ireland, and allows businesses to alert the
unit to identified issues, which require an enforcement re-
sponse. Moreover, it creates a culture where staff are aware
of the increased vigilance to fraudulent activity and gives them
the confidence to report suspicions of wrongdoing (Powell et
al. 2013; TiFSiP 2016). Threat analysis critical control point
(TACCP) is another risk-based tool advocated in the literature
for food fraud. However, this is a tool for addressing inten-
tional food offence issues carried out for malicious purposes,
not food fraud carried out for economic gain. It is therefore
evident that academia and the industry need clarity on the
categorisation of the factors influencing food integrity and
the proposed risk assessment tools. The proposed food integ-
rity matrix (Fig. 5) addresses this confusion and illustrates that
food fraud, offence, quality and safety are the four factors
which affect food integrity. Food quality and safety factors
are the unintentional biological, chemical and physical haz-
ards to food quality and safety addressed by HACCP. Food
offence is an intentional threat to food safety and quality for
malicious purposes addressed by TACCP. Food Fraud is an
intentional act for economic gain, which could lead to a food
quality or safety incident, addressed by VACCP. Whilst each
of these factors are stand-alone entities by definition
and motivation, they are integrated as they each com-
promise food integrity and create uncertainties to the
other three factors. Moreover, their consequences and
methods for detection and mitigation include similar as-
pects. This is illustrated in the numerous examples of
food fraud incidents, which create food quality and food
safety repercussions.
Ultimately, a food integrity management system compris-
ing of HACCP, VACCP and TACCP is crucial to help the
industry assign countermeasures which protect food safety,
quality, authenticity and security issues and achieve consumer
trust in the food industry (Kleboth et al. 2016; Jenson and
Sumner 2012; Jevsnik et al. 2008; Papademas and Bintsis
2010; Powell et al. 2013;Ramsingh 2014). Recently,
Kleboth et al. (2016) carried out a similar review of the food
fraud literature. This literature proposed complex system risk-
based auditing, which is a function of triggers, goal, context,
food chain participant, time, methodology and content. These
stages are all involved in the VACCP procedure, and thus
would involve unnecessary duplication or change to current
industry certification schemes. Moreover, it does not recog-
nise the need for evidence gathering and targeted education
and awareness. However, the proposed framework (Fig. 5) is a
promising initiative for regulatory and third party certification
schemes to address current audit limitations.
6.2 Evidence
Food Fraud VACCP, although a similar concept to HACCP, is
fundamentally different. For HACCP very capable practices
and governance already exist, but the ever evolving and
emerging nature of opportunistic fraud introduces new
VACCP gaps (TiFSiP 2016; Manning et al. 2016). There has
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been a range of different detection methods applied to food
authenticity, including spectroscopy (ultraviolet-visible (UV),
near infrared (NIR) and mid infrared (MIR), Raman), isotopic
analysis, chromatography, electric nose, polymerase chain re-
action, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay and thermal
analysis, and their combination with multivariate data analysis
software (Reid et al. 2006; Ellis et al. 2012; Black et al. 2016).
These methods must be evaluated in full for ease of use, ra-
pidity and cost whilst surviving the rigours of a legal process
to provide a sufficient deterrent (Black et al. 2016). Similarly,
the literature and the persistence of food-borne illnesses and
scandals has raised significant concern on the functioning of
the supply chain and the monitoring methods employed for
their supervision, particularly exposing weaknesses in current
traceability and audit systems (Folinas et al. 2006; Aven 2012;
Powell et al. 2013; FAO 2016b; Ringsberg 2014; Lidskog et
al. 2015; NFCU 2016; Stamatis et al. 2015; Kleboth et al.
2016; Manning et al. 2016). A preliminary review of the data
suggests that the underlying cause of such events is shortcom-
ings in audits, enforcement and current countermeasures with-
in the industry, as opposed to the HACCP, VACCP and
TACCP tools. It is also important to recognise that the ad-
vancement of detection and research efforts in the supply
chain have contributed to the increased uncovering of ‘scan-
dals’, which have potentially existed for decades.
Nevertheless, this exposes a significant flaw in current re-
search efforts. The literature continues to identify weaknesses
and develop and propose enhanced methods of detection.
However academia, industry experts and policy makers have
failed to collaborate and take the responsibility to evaluate this
research, allocate acceptable and economically viable analyt-
ical methods and mitigation strategies and standardise defini-
tions and methodologies for the supply chain. Thus, the re-
search has limited benefit to the industry and has failed to
achieve a sufficient deterrent to diminish fraudulent opportu-
nity. The nature of food fraud and current information gaps
makes evaluating and assigning effective and efficient coun-
termeasures one of the most challenging aspects of assuring
food integrity. Thus, a task force or working group, such as
funding academic institutions to support a public-private part-
nership which addresses food fraud, is imperative. The work-
ing group should conduct research and gather evidence on the
factors affecting food fraud, including the macro-economic
trends (such as global commodity price fluctuations), the
micro-economic factors (such as vulnerability of a product
transported through an unregulated free trade zone), suitable
countermeasures, the resources and ongoing activities in the
country and the category of offenders and their modus
operandi (such as identifying sequences, settings, and how
the activity fits into supply chain networks) (Canter 2000;
Williams 2001; Felson 2006; Spink et al. 2013; PAS 96
2014; Spink et al. 2014; Manning et al. 2016; Spink et al.
2016a). Ultimately, this research is fundamental to
contributing to a governance plan which considers a balance
between resources, constraints, including inspection and over-
sight, as well as optimizing the public and private activities
(Spink et al. 2016b).
6.3 Awareness and targeted education
TheUK has been proactive in recognising and funding research
into food fraud. To date this work has been typically carried out
by a working group of academia and industry experts.
However, it is crucial that the supply chain players are informed
of known intelligence and verified methodologies. The provi-
sion of targeted education should be used as a means of raising
awareness and informing the industry of the issues in the sea-
food supply chain and ensuring they are competent in assigning
and implementing effective and economically viable counter-
measures. This is vital as it has been suggested that many actors
are unable to fully understand the complexity of the supply
chain, in all its facets, disciplines and developments.
Consequently straightforward and insufficient mechanisms of
control are introduced (Kleboth et al. 2016). In addition,
Williams (2001) argues that bureaucratic rivalry and competi-
tion; inter-agency antipathies and; a hesitance to share informa-
tion, align databases and coordinate operations constrains cur-
rent practices. Information sharing would allow the govern-
ment to understand and construct enhanced legislation, inspec-
tion and enforcement and allocate sufficient resources and sup-
port to the industry to equip them with the skills to implement
VACCP optimally. Eventually, the increased awareness and
uptake of prevention, surveillance and detection measures
would encourage a food safety culture, increase the apprehen-
sion of ‘getting caught’ and act as a deterrence.
6.4 Governance
It can be challenging to govern food fraud as it can be imple-
mented internally and externally in a specific company and/or
its subsidiaries at any node of the supply chain. Moreover, in
many cases small-medium enterprises cannot perform or af-
ford the reliable and high specification technology to detect
and gather evidence of conventional adulterants, as described
previously (Reid et al. 2006; Ellis et al. 2012; Black et al.
2016). It is therefore of utmost importance that deterrence of
food fraud is implemented by each player in the supply chain
and verified and governed by suitable guardians such as reg-
ulatory bodies and recognised third party certification
schemes. In order to facilitate this, a government wide food
prevention plan needs to be constructed. This plan needs to
ensure a food fraud responsibility and food integrity manage-
ment system, comprising HACCP, TACCP and VACCP, that
is defined and required in legislation, specifically under
existing food regulations (Spink et al. 2016a). It should in-
clude mapping of the whole supply chain, provide
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identification of the vulnerabilities and allocate monitoring
and mitigation strategies, resources and responsibility
(TiFSiP 2016). This clarity is fundamental in order to assign
responsibility and accountability to each enterprise in the sup-
ply chain, stipulate the required standards and identify the
critical points which inspection and enforcement officers
should evaluate and verify against a standard and prosecute
as necessary. Ultimately, the goal of this mitigation plan is to
proactively reduce the opportunity for fraud. However, this is
still a relatively new concept for the industry and those carry-
ing out fraud may continue to find new opportunities and
methods to intervene. In this case, detection, enforcement,
prosecution and punishment become important elements to
further reduce the opportunity (Spink and Moyer 2014).
7 Conclusion
Combatting food fraud is an integral component of ensuring
food integrity. It is important to ensure the sustainability of the
food industry and responsible enterprises in the supply chain,
to allow consumers’ rights and confidence in food production
and to eliminate any uncertainties regarding consumer health.
This review has mapped the seafood supply chains, identified
the opportunities for the nine sins of seafood at each node and
revealed examples of fraud, which have occurred in the sea-
food supply chains. The examples used are only a sample of
the issues, which have occurred within the seafood supply
chains but they highlight the extensive difficulties encountered
by fraud specialists (analysts). The next stage is for stake-
holders, including academia, analytical laboratories, regulatory
bodies and industry to investigate these seafood supply chains
and work together to evaluate and allocate effective, econom-
ically viable and standardised mitigation strategies. This re-
view has led to some key future recommendations whereby it
will be important to carry out sound risk ranking on the vul-
nerability of the seafood supply chains to fraud; to assign ef-
fective economically viable mitigation strategies at critical con-
trol points; to evaluate current and innovative detection
methods for the authenticity of food; to work towards robust,
easy to use, rapid and inexpensive analytical techniques which
would be upheld in legal proceedings; to construct a governing
plan which considers a balance between resources and con-
straints and assigns responsibility and accountability to each
supply chain player and guardian; to implement targeted edu-
cation to the supply chain players and equip them with the
knowledge to implement HACCP, VACCP and TACCP opti-
mally; to work together to address the challenges of current
traceability practices in the increasingly complex and global
supply chains. This review illustrates the fundamental first
steps to be undertaken for all food commodities in understand-
ing the nodes of vulnerability to food fraud for the introduction
of effective risk ranking and mitigation strategies.
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